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Penultimate draft of: 
Double Effect and the End-not-means Principle: A Response to Bennett, 
Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol., 16, No. 2, 1999, 181-185. 
T. A. Cavanaugh, Philosophy, University of San Francisco 
DOUBLE EFFECT AND THE END-NOT-MEANS PRINCIPLE: 
A RESPONSE TO BENNETT 
Deontologists, absolutists, and proponents of common morality often rely on 
double-effect reasoning -- also referred to as the ‘principle’, ‘rule’, or ‘doctrine’ 
of double effect -- to contrast, amongst other actions, terror and tactical bombing.i 
Advocates of double effect think that, other things being equal -- such as the 
number and probability of non-combatant deaths -- tactical bombing is more 
easily justified than terror bombing.ii For, these thinkers argue, in terror bombing 
an agent intends non-combatant deaths as a means while in tactical bombing an 
agent foresees but does not intend non-combatant deaths -- neither as a means 
nor as an end. Thus, double-effect reasoning partially reposes on a distinction 
between consequentially similar states of affairs being intended as a means or 
foreseen as a concomitant but not intended.iii This is the intended/foreseen 
distinction. In what follows, I defend the ethical relevance of this distinction 
against a charge recently leveled by Jonathan Bennett.iv 
I. Bennett’s Objection 
 In articulating the ethical relevance of the intended/foreseen distinction 
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proponents of double effect often rely on the Kantian intuition that it is wrong to 
treat another human being, an end-in-itself, merely as a means to furthering some 
other end -- the end-not-means principle.v According to many who rely on double 
effect, tactical bombing is more easily justified than terror bombing because 
tactical bombing does not treat noncombatants as mere means to the realization of 
an end while terror bombing does. Thus, terror bombing violates the 
end-not-means principle while tactical bombing does not. 
 Jonathan Bennett finds this position implausible: 
I can find no reading of the ‘end not means’ principle 
which makes it both plausible and relevant to [maintaining 
that the intended/foreseen distinction has ethical import]. If 
there is one, it must not only clear the tactical bomber of 
using the civilians as a means, but must imply that he is 
treating them as ends. Tell that to the civilians! (Bennett, p. 
218) 
Bennett thinks that in order to contrast terror and tactical bombing in terms of the 
end-not-means principle, tactical bombing should benefit the non-combatants. 
According to him, it is not sufficient that tactical bombing not treat the 
non-combatants as means. For, if this were enough, the principle would require 
nothing more positive of an act than mere indifference to the harm voluntarily 
caused. Thus, Bennett reads the end-not-means principle conjunctively as 
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requiring that one both not treat others as means and that one benefit them. If 
Bennett is correct, the intended/foreseen distinction does not have ethical 
relevance in terms of the end-not-means principle. For, although it is not 
undertaken to do so, tactical bombing harms non-combatants. 
 I propose that the end-not-means principle be read disjunctively as laying 
it down that one is to act either ideally for the sake of others, i.e. positively treat 
them as ends; or, one must not treat others as mere means to one’s own end: one 
must treat them as ends negatively. Thus, in response to Bennett, I hold that “to 
treat another as an end” is ambiguous between positively treating others as ends 
by benefitting them and negatively treating others as ends by not treating them 
merely as means. The disjunctive reading of the end-not-means principle clarifies 
this ambiguity. 
II. The Disjunctive Reading 
 To illustrate the disjunctive reading of the end-not-means principle, 
consider the following types of bombing in an otherwise just war that cause 
consequentially comparable harm to non-combatants: relief bombing, risky 
tactical bombing, safe tactical bombing, terror bombing, and punitive bombing. 
 Relief bombing is undertaken to benefit non-combatants. A paradigm case 
of relief bombing is bombing that relieves the siege of a city occupied by 
non-combatants. The point of such bombing is to benefit the non-combatants. 
Nonetheless, such bombing may harm some of the non-combatants on whose 
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behalf it is undertaken. For example, it may sometimes not be possible not to 
harm some of the non-combatants as one relieves the siege, for the forces laying 
siege to the city may be so close to the non-combatants that bombs dropped on the 
forces inevitably harm some non-combatants. Call relief bombing that harms 
some of the non-combatants on whose behalf it is undertaken harmful relief 
bombing. 
 As noted, tactical bombing is undertaken to destroy a military target. 
Tactical bombing may sometimes concomitantly harm non-combatants. Because a 
tactical bomber might be able to minimize such harm by placing himself at risk, 
two instances need to be distinguished. First, there is 
risky-non-combatant-harm-minimization-tactical-bombing, henceforth, risky 
tactical bombing. In risky tactical bombing, the tactical bomber places himself at 
risk in order to minimize harm to non-combatants. For example, the bomber may 
be able to minimize the harm tactical bombing causes to non-combatants by 
bombing from a low altitude that enables greater precision, but also places the 
bomber at greater risk.vi In contrast to risky tactical bombing there is safe tactical 
bombing. In safe tactical bombing, although he can, the tactical bomber does not 
take risks in order to minimize harm to non-combatants. 
 Terror bombing harms, kills, and terrorizes non-combatants as a means of 
lowering morale and thereby achieving victory. In terror bombing, the killing, 
maiming, and terrifying of non-combatants are means of achieving victory -- an 
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otherwise legitimate military goal. Of course, as considered in the debate 
concerning the ethical relevance of the intended/foreseen distinction, terror 
bombing excludes gratuitous harming of non-combatants. The terror bomber 
harms only to the extent necessary to achieve his goal. 
 Finally, there is punitive bombing that kills and harms non-combatants for 
its own sake, “out of hatred for what their country has done.”vii Punitive bombing 
may further some military goal, but it is not undertaken for the sake of such a 
goal. Thus, punitive bombing is gratuitous harming. 
 Other things being equal, such as the number and probability of 
non-combatant deaths, the above outlined types of bombing can be arranged in 
terms of justifiability by a disjunctive reading of the end-not-means principle. 
Employing the disjunctive reading of the end-not-means principle, harmful relief 
bombing, risky tactical bombing, and safe tactical bombing are justifiable -- given 
the earlier mentioned consequentialist caveat concerning a comparison of overall 
benefit to overall harm -- to the extent to which they meet the ethically acceptable 
minimum of not treating the non-combatants as mere means. 
 Moreover, other things being equal, harmful relief bombing is more easily 
justified than both risky and safe tactical bombing while risky tactical bombing is 
more easily justified than safe tactical bombing. One implication of holding that 
harmful relief bombing is more justifiable than both risky and safe tactical 
bombing is that harmful relief bombing can be justified when neither risky nor 
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safe tactical bombing can. For example, one can be justified in causing more harm 
or harm with greater probability in a case of harmful relief bombing than in cases 
of risky and safe tactical bombing. Similarly, to hold that risky tactical bombing is 
more justifiable than safe tactical bombing is to hold that one can be justified in 
causing more harm or harm with greater probability in risky tactical bombing than 
in safe tactical bombing. 
 Considering terror and punitive bombing, the principle rules out both to 
the extent to which they fail to meet the ethically acceptable minimum of not 
treating the non-combatants as mere means. Moreover, although neither are 
justifiable, punitive bombing is worse than terror bombing. 
 How do the above relations hold in terms of the principle read 
disjunctively? Insofar as harmful relief bombing benefits non-combatants and is 
undertaken on their behalf, it lives up to the ideal of positively treating others as 
existing for their own sakes. Moreover, although it harms non-combatants, it does 
not use them. Risky tactical bombing in part falls short and in part lives up to the 
ideal, for while tactical bombing itself is not undertaken on behalf of the 
non-combatants, the risk in risky tactical bombing is born for their sake. In this 
respect, although it harms and does not benefit the non-combatants, risky tactical 
bombing does incorporate an attempt to reduce harm while not using the 
non-combatants and to this extent positively treats them as ends. 
 Safe tactical bombing entirely falls short of the ideal of benefitting the 
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non-combatants, not even bearing risk in order to minimize harm. Nonetheless, 
like risky tactical bombing, safe tactical bombing does not violate the default -- 
the ethically acceptable minimum requirement -- for it does not use the 
non-combatants. Although it entirely falls short of the ideal, it does not fall below 
the ethically acceptable minimum of not treating the non-combatants as mere 
means to another end. Thus, safe tactical bombing negatively treats the 
non-combatants as ends. Terror bombing does not even negatively treat the 
non-combatants as ends, for terror bombing uses the non-combatants to achieve 
victory. Thus, in terms of the disjunctive reading of the end-not-means principle, 
terror bombing cannot be justified while safe tactical bombing can. 
 Terror bombing, although it is not justifiable, is not as bad as punitive 
bombing; for it does not violate the non-combatants’ status as ends as egregiously 
as punitive bombing. Since punitive bombing is undertaken solely for the sake of 
the terror and the harm caused to the non-combatants it stands most opposed to 
the ideal expressed by the end-not-means principle. For that ideal would have the 
non-combatants acted on behalf of, while punitive bombing kills and terrorizes for 
the sake of killing and terrorizing. Thus, punitive bombing is the worst kind of 
bombing. 
 Underlying the two elements of the end-not-means principle -- the ideal 
and the default -- is the position that people are ends in themselves. That is, 
people exist for their own sake; as existing for their own sake, one ought either to 
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act on their behalf or, at the very least, not subordinate them to other goals. 
Reconsidering Bennett’s reading of the principle, one realizes that while the 
end-not-means principle does not pick out one and only one way of behaving 
towards others as acceptable -- benefitting them -- it does rest its judgements on 
one and only one ground: persons exist for their own sake. This one basis 
implicates a variety of ethical judgments, as the various types of bombing 
illustrate. 
 The disjunctive reading of the end-not-means principle compares 
favorably to Bennett’s reading on at least two counts. First, from one basis -- that 
people are ends in themselves --  the disjunctive reading generates a variety of 
judgements regarding the ideal, the permissible, and the impermissible. Read 
disjunctively, the end-not-means principle articulates common morality’s 
intuitions that there are minimum ethically acceptable norms of behavior and acts 
that rise significantly above the minimum. Moreover, read disjunctively, the 
principle captures nuances concerning the better and worse amongst those acts 
judged to be permissible or impermissible. The conjunctive reading fails to 
capture these distinctions and nuances. Second, although Kant’s precise meaning 
is not at issue, the disjunctive reading is closer to what Kant himself proposes in 
his distinction between perfect duties to others -- for example, never to lie -- and 
imperfect duties to others -- for example, to give to others from one’s own 
abundance.viii 
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 The different types of bombing indicate that there is a plausible reading of 
the end-not-means principle in terms of which tactical bombing is more justifiable 
than terror bombing. Yet, how does this relate to the ethical relevance of the 
intended/foreseen distinction? 
 The relation between the intended/foreseen distinction and the 
end-not-means principle concerns intention. By definition, an end or means is 
intended. Ends and means are not only the effects of agents, they are the intended 
effects of agents. Agents cause means for the sake of ends and -- using means -- 
cause ends for their own sake. Thus, something is a means or an end not merely 
because an agent causes it, but only if the agent causes it -- a means -- to achieve 
something for the sake of which the agent acts -- an end. Thus, the end-not-means 
principle -- not itself offering an account of intention -- necessarily relies on an 
account of intention. Accordingly, the principle depends on the intended/foreseen 
distinction insofar as the distinction marks the difference between causing 
something as an end or means and causing something voluntarily, but neither as 
an end nor as a means. Similarly, the intended/foreseen distinction does not 
account for its own ethical relevance, but relies on the end-not-means principle to 
do so. 
 In conclusion, I have articulated the disjunctive reading of the 
end-not-means principle. I have indicated the plausibility of this reading, noting 
how it captures a variety of intuitive moral judgments and corresponds to 
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distinctions Kant proposes. I have shown how this reading of the principle relates 
to and grounds the ethical significance of the intended/foreseen distinction. 
Moreover, to the extent to which double-effect reasoning partially depends upon 
the ethical relevance of the intended/foreseen distinction, I have shown the 
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justifiable, while one need not hold that terror bombing is justifiable. Thus, while 
all proponents of double effect hold that tactical bombing is more easily justified 
than terror bombing, there may be disagreement concerning whether terror 
bombing is ever justified. As I read the end-not-means principle in section II, it 
rules out terror bombing as never justifiable. 
iiiOn the importance of other considerations in double-effect reasoning, see 
WOODWARD, P. A. (1997) The Importance of the Proportionality Condition to 
the Doctrine of Double Effect: A Response to Fischer, Ravizza, and Copp, 
Journal of Social Philosophy, 28, pp. 140-152. 
ivBENNETT, JONATHAN (1995) The Act Itself (Oxford:Clarendon Press) 
vOf course, Kant is the classical source of the end-not-means principle. For 
contemporary uses of the end-not-means principle, see Quinn op. cit.; and 
KAMM, F.M. (1992) Non-consequentialism, the Person as an End-in-Itself, and 
the Significance of Status, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 21, pp. 354-389. 
viMichael Walzer argues that in cases to which double effect applies, when one 
can, one must bear risks in order to minimize the harm one forseeably causes to 
others. See WALZER, MICHAEL (1977) Just and Unjust Wars (New York: 
Basic Books). Read disjunctively, the end-not-means principle recommends risky 
tactical bombing to the extent to which it satisfies the ideal by treating the 
non-combatants as ends. However, read disjunctively, the principle does not 
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require such an act, for one would not be treating the non-combatants as mere 
means if one were not to put oneself at risk. 
viiIn calling this “punitive bombing”, I follow Bennett, op. cit., p. 215. 
viiiBoth perfect and imperfect duties are ultimately grounded on the end-not-means 
formulation of the categorical imperative. As Paton states: “We transgress perfect 
duties by treating any person merely as a means. We transgress imperfect duties 
by failing to treat a person as an end, even though we do not actively treat him as 
a means.” PATON, H.J. (1948) The Categorical Imperative: A Study in Kant’s 
Moral Philosophy (Chicago:University of Chicago Press). 
